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Abstract: Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result
without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot
fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot
stuffing.
In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious
bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme
that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into
a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin
board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration
authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials.
We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these
criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira andWarinschi weakly verifiable.
By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong
verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing). The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity
of Helios and has been implemented and tested.
Key-words: voting protocols, individual verifiability, universal verifiability, ballot stuffing, ballot privacy,
Helios
Des élections plus vérifiables pour Helios, sous des hypothèses de
confiance plus faibles
Résumé : La plupart des systèmes de vote électroniques cherchent à être vérifiables: les votants de-
vraient pouvoir croire le résultat proclamé sans devoir faire confiance à une autorité particulière. En fait,
même un système de vote bien connu comme Helios n’est pas parfaitement vérifiable. En effet, une
urne malhonnête pourrait ajouter des bulletins à la place des votants qui se sont abstenus. Ce problème
s’appelle le bourrage d’urne.
Dans cet article, nous définissons une notion de vérifiabilité qui prend en compte le fait qu’une urne
malhonnête pourrait tenter d’ajouter des bulletins. Puis nous proposons une construction générique qui
permet de transformer un système de vote vérifiable pour une urne honnête (vérifiabilité faible), en un
système de vote vérifiable sous une hypothèse de confiance plus faible: l’autorité d’enregistrement et
l’urne ne doivent pas être simultanément corrompues (vérifiabilité forte). Cette construction requière
simplement une autorité d’enregistrement supplémentaire qui envoie un "crédit" privé à chaque votant et
publie les partie publiques des "crédits".
Nous proposons également un critère simple qui assure la vérifiabilité faible. En application de ce
critère, nous prouvons formellement que la dernière version d’Helios, par Bernhard, Pereira et Warinschi,
est faiblement vérifiable. Puis en appliquant notre construction générique, nous obtenons une variante
d’Helios qui garantit à la fois le secret du vote et la vérifiabilité forte (et donc prévient le bourrage
d’urne). Le schéma de vote correspondant, Helios-C, conserve la simplicité d’Helios. Il a été implémenté
et testé.
Mots-clés : protocoles de vote, vérifiabilité individuelle, vérifiabilité universelle, bourrage d’urne, con-
fidentialité des votes, Helios
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1 Introduction
Ideally, a voting system should be both private and verifiable. Privacy ensures that no one knows that a
certain voter has voted in a particular way. Verifiability ensures that voters should be able to check that,
even in the presence of dishonest tallying authorities, their ballots contribute to the outcome (individual
verifiability) and that the the published result corresponds to the intended votes of the voters (universal
verifiability). One leading voting system designed to achieve both privacy and verifiability is Helios [2],
based on a classical voting system proposed by Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers [12] with variants
proposed by Benaloh [4]. Helios is an open-source voting system that has been used several times to
run real-world elections, including the election of the president of the University of Louvain-La-Neuve
and the election of the 2010, 2011, and 2012 new board directors of the International Association for
Cryptographic Research (IACR) [1]. Helios has been shown to ensure ballot privacy for successively
stronger notions of privacy and more accurate implementations [10, 5, 6].
The remaining question is whether the result of an election run through Helios does correspond to
the votes cast by the voters. Put in other words, is Helios verifiable? According to Juels, Catalano and
Jakobsson (JCJ) definition [19], Helios is individually and universally verifiable1, although we are not
aware of any proof of verifiability in a computational model. In fact, Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi
(BPW) [6] showed recently that existing Helios versions [3] are not verifiable due to the use of a weak
version of the Fiat-Shamir transformation in the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of ballot well-
formedness. They showed that when the standard version of Fiat-Shamir is used, then Helios has ballot
privacy but they do not prove verifiability. The forthcoming Helios version 4.0 is planned to incorporate
these changes [3].
Still, JCJ’s definition assumes the bulletin board to be honest: an attacker may cast dishonest ballots
on the behalf of dishonest voters but no extra ballots may be added nor deleted. This means for example
that the result of the election of the 2012 board of the IACR can be trusted only under the assumption that
the election server was neither dishonest nor attacked, during the whole duration of the election. This is
a rather unsatisfactory assumption, since adding a few extra ballots may easily change the outcome of an
election. In the case of Helios, this is mitigated by the fact that voters’ identities are public. If the bulletin
board adds ballots, it has to tell which voters are supposed to have cast these ballots. Thus hopefully,
these voters should notice that the server wrongly cast ballots on their names and would complain. Such
complaints are however not guaranteed since absentees typically do not care much about the election.
Things may be even worse. In some countries (like France), whether someone voted or not is a private
information (that can be accessed only by voters of the same precinct, through a rather heavy procedure).
It is therefore forbidden to publicly reveal the identities of the voters who cast a vote. Moreover, publish-
ing voters identities compromises privacy in the future: once the public key of the election will be broken
(say in 20 years), everyone will learn the vote of each voter. A simple alternative consists in removing
the disclosure of voters’ identities. This variant of Helios remains perfectly practical and of course still
preserves ballot privacy. But it then becomes completely straightforward for a corrupted bulletin board to
add as many ballots as needed to change the legitimate election result.
Election verifiability under weaker trust assumptions. We first provide an extension of the definition
of individual and universal verifiability by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [19], that accounts for ballot
stuffing. Throughout the paper we will sometimes use verifiability to refer to individual and universal
verifiability. Intuitively, a voting scheme is verifiable if the result corresponds to the votes of
• all honest voters that have checked that their vote was cast correctly (in Helios, this amounts into
checking that the encrypted vote appears on the bulletin board);
1JCJ uses the terms correctness and verifiability, which we rename as individual and universal verifiability and tally uniqueness
respectively, as we think the latter terminology matches better the e-voting literature and it is also more accurate.
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• at most n valid votes where n is the number of corrupted voters (i.e. the attacker may only use the
corrupted voters to cast valid votes);
• a subset of the votes cast by honest voters that did not check their vote was cast correctly (in
practice, many voters do not perform any check).
As in [19], this definition requires the tally function to admit partial tallying (that is, it is possible to
compute the tally by blocks and then retrieve the final result). This is satisfied by most election systems,
notably those consisting on counting the number of votes that every candidate from a given list received,
and those whose outcome is the multiset of cast votes.
Our first main contribution is a generic construction that transforms any verifiable voting scheme that
assumes both the registration authority and the bulletin board honest, into a verifiable voting scheme
under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simulta-
neously dishonest. We show that our transformation also turns ballot privacy and tally uniqueness (as
defined in Section 3.3) w.r.t. honest bulletin board and registration authority, into ballot privacy and tally
uniqueness w.r.t. non simultaneously dishonest bulletin board and registration authority. Throughout the
paper we will sometimes use strong verifiability to refer to individual and universal verifiability against
non simultaneously dishonest bulletin board and registration authority.
We stress that verifiability cannot come without trust assumptions: the key issue relies on the fact
that some mechanism is necessary to authenticate voters, that is, to make sure that Bob is not voting
in the name of Alice. In Helios-like protocols, the bulletin board is the only authority that controls
the right to vote. It may therefore easily stuff itself, that is, it may easily add ballots. To control the
bulletin board, it is necessary to consider an additional authority. In our solution, a so-called registrar
authority, provides each voter with a private credential (actually a signing key) that has a public part (the
verification key). The set of all public credentials is public and, in particular, known to the bulletin board.
Then each voter simply signs his ballot with his private credential. Note that the association between a
public credential and the corresponding voter’s identity does not need to be known and actually, should
not be disclosed to satisfy e.g. the French requirements regarding voting systems. It is also possible
to have the registration authority to generate the credentials off-line and to distribute them using a non-
digital channel, e.g. snail mail. This minimizes the risk of Internet-based attacks against the registration
authority. We have designed our solution having in mind the guidelines set for the e-voting setup used for
the expatriates at the 2012 French legislative elections [23].
The advantage of our approach relies on its simplicity: the additional authority is only responsible
for generating and distributing the credentials of the voters. Once it is done, it can erase these records.
It consists on one offline layer added on top of the existing voting protocol; therefore it needs not to be
changed and its infrastructure is kept. In particular, our solution does not require any additional server.
We have also considered the possibility of using anonymous credentials [7]. Our preliminary conclu-
sion discards a direct application in our transformation. This is due to the fact that anonymous credentials
allow its owners to unlinkably “show” the same credential multiple times. In our case this property
potentially allows a voter to vote several times without being detected, and then verifiability cannot be
achieved.
Criteria for universal verifiability. Since proving verifiability against cheating tallying authorities, even
assuming honest bulletin board and registration authority, may not be easy, we provide a simple and
natural criteria that implies verifiability. We show that any correct and accurate voting protocol with tally
uniqueness is universally verifiable (w.r.t. an honest bulletin board). Correctness accounts for the natural
property that the tally of just honestly cast ballots should always yield the expected result (typically the
sum of the votes). Accuracy ensures that any ballot (possibly dishonest) that passes the verification check
(e.g. valid proof, well-formedness of the ballots) corresponds to a valid vote. Tally uniqueness ensures
that two different results cannot be announced for a single election. Our criteria are satisfied in particular
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by Helios and we expect it to be satisfied by many existing voting protocols. As a result we provide the
first proof of verifiability for the Helios-BPW voting scheme [6] in a computational model.
A verifiable Helios-like scheme that prevents ballot stuffing. By applying our generic construction to
Helios-BPW we obtain a voting scheme, that we name as Helios with Credentials (Helios-C), which is
verifiable against cheating tallying authorities under the weak assumption that the bulletin board and the
registration authority are not simultaneously dishonest. Helios-C is ballot private if the tallying authority
behaves honestly. We have implemented Helios-C and used it in a mock election.
Related work. To the best of our knowledge, the only proofs of verifiability for Helios have been con-
ducted in abstract models. Delaune, Kremer and Ryan [13] define individual and universal verifiability
in a symbolic model and prove that Helios satisfy both. Like for all symbolic models, the cryptographic
primitives are abstracted by terms and are not analyzed. Küsters et al. have put forward quantitative
measurements of verifiability and accountability in [20, 21, 22] that take into account ballot stuffing. In
particular, [22] gives accountability measures on several abstractions of Helios. In contrast to [22], our
verifiability framework is less expressive, but on the contrary we prove verifiability in the computational
model. Verifiability proofs like those of [13] and [20, 21, 22] can typically not detect flaws that on the
cryptographic primitives, like those found by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi [6]. Groth [16] studies a
generalized version of Helios in the Universal Composability framework, but it does not address universal
verifiability.
2 Syntax of a voting system
Election systems typically involve several entities. For the sake of simplicity we consider each entity to
consist of only one individual but all of them could be thresholdized.
1. Election Administrator: Denoted by E , is responsible for setting up the election. It publishes
the identities id of eligible voters, the list of candidates and the result function ρ of the election
(typically counting the number of votes every candidate received).
2. Registrar: Denoted byR, is responsible for distributing secret credentials to voters and registering
the corresponding public credentials.
3. Trustee: Denoted by T , is in charge of tallying and publishing a final result.
4. Voters: The eligible voters id1, . . . , idτ are participating in the election.
5. Bulletin board manager: Denoted by B, is responsible for processing ballots and storing valid
ballots in the bulletin board BB.
2.1 Voting algorithms
We continue by describing the syntax for an electronic voting protocol that we will be using thorough
the paper. The syntax below considers single-pass schemes, namely systems where voters only have to
post a single message in the board. A voting protocol is always relative to a family of result functions
R = {ρτ}τ≥1 for τ ∈ N, where ρτ : Vτ → R , R is the result space and V is the set of admissible
votes. A voting protocol V = (Setup,Credential,Vote,Validate,Box,VerifyVote,Tally,Verify) consists
of eight algorithms whose syntax is as follows:
Setup(1λ) on input a security parameter 1λ, outputs an election public/secret pair (pk, sk), where pk
typically contains the public key of the election and/or a list of credentials L. We assume pk to be
an implicit input of the remaining algorithms.
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Credential(1λ, id) on inputs a security parameter 1λ and an identifier id, outputs the secret part of the
credential uskid and its public credential upkid, where upkid is added to the list L = {upkid}.
Vote(id, upk, usk, v) is used by voter id to cast his choice v ∈ V. It outputs a ballot b, which may/may
not include the identifier id or the public credential upk. The ballot b is sent to the bulletin board
through an authenticated channel. At some point, the voter may reach a state where he/she considers
his/her vote has been counted, typically after having run the algorithm VerifyVote defined below.
The voter then set CheckedVoter(id, v, b) to true.
Validate(b) on input a ballot b returns 1 for well-formed ballots and 0 otherwise.
Box(BB, b) takes as inputs the bulletin board BB and a ballot b and outputs an updated BB. Typically,
this algorithm performs some checks on b with respect to the contents of BB and, possibly, a local
state st. Depending on these checks, BB and st are updated; in any case BB remains unchanged if
Validate(b) rejects (that is returns 0). We say that BB is well-formed if Validate(b) = 1 for every
b ∈ BB.
VerifyVote(BB, id, upk, usk, b) is a typically light algorithm intended to the voters, for checking that
their ballots will be included in the tally. On inputs the board BB, a ballot b, and the voter’s identity
and credentials id, usk, upk, returns 1 or 0.
Tally(BB, sk) takes as input the bulletin board BB and the secret key sk. After some checks, it outputs
the tally ρ, together with a proof of correct tabulation Π. Possibly, ρ =⊥, meaning the election has
been declared invalid.
Verify(BB, ρ,Π) on inputs the bulletin board BB, and a pair (ρ,Π), checks whether Π is a valid proof
of correct tallying for ρ. It returns 1 if so; otherwise it returns 0.
The exact implementation of the algorithms of course depends on the voting protocol under con-
sideration. In Helios, the authenticated channel is instantiated by a login and a password and we have
upkid ∈ {∅, id, pid} depending on the variants. upkid = id corresponds to the standard case where the
identity of the voter is appended to the ballot and displayed on the bulletin board. upkid = pid, where
pid is a pseudonym on identity id, corresponds to the case where only pseudonyms are displayed, to
provide more privacy to the voters. Finally, upkid = ∅ corresponds to the case where only the raw ballot
is displayed on the bulletin board. We provide in Section 5 a complete description of the Helios protocol
and our variant of it.
2.2 Correctness
Next we define the minimal requirement, called correctness, that any voting protocol must satisfy. It sim-
ply requires that honest executions yield the expected outcome, that is, honestly cast ballots are accepted
to the BB (and pass the verification checks) and that, in an honest setting, the tally procedure always
yields the expected outcome (that is, the result function). Let BB := {∅}. A voting scheme is correct if:
(1) For i ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, it holds that Validate(bi) = 1, VerifyVote
(
Box(BB, bi), idi, upki, uski, bi
)
= 1,
and Box(BB, bi) = BB ∪ {bi}, where bi ← Vote(idi, upki, uski, vi) for some vi ∈ V; (2) Tally({b1,
. . . , bτ}, sk) outputs (ρ(v1, . . . , vτ ),Π); and (3) Verify({b1, . . . , bτ}, ρ(v1, . . . , vτ ),Π) = 1. The above
properties can be relaxed to hold only with overwhelming probability.
3 Verifiability Definitions
In this section we give individual and universal verifiability definitions in which the election administrator
is honest, but trustee and voters are assumed to be dishonest. As emphasized in Introduction, verifiability
Inria
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partly relies on the authentication of the voters. There are various ways to authenticate voters, but in each
case, it requires some trust assumptions. Our minimal trust assumption is that the registrar and the bulletin
board are not simultaneously dishonest. We further define a property, that we call tally uniqueness, where
no party is assumed be honest (except for the election administrator).
3.0.1 Partial tallying
We focus on voting protocols that admit partial tallying. This property is specified by two natural re-
quirements usually satisfied in most election scenarios. Firstly, the result function ρ : Vτ → R for
V must admit partial counting, namely ρ(S1 ∪ S2) = ρ(S1) ?R ρ(S2) for any two lists S1, S2 con-
taining sequences of elements v ∈ V and where ?R : R × R → R is a commutative operation. For
example, the standard result function that counts the number of votes per candidate admits partial count-
ing. Secondly, the algorithm Tally must admit partial tallying, i.e. let (ρ1,Π1) ← Tally(BB1, sk) and
(ρ2,Π2) ← Tally(BB2, sk). Let (ρ,Π) ← Tally(BB1 ∪ BB2, sk) with ρ different from invalid and BB1
and BB2 disjoint. Then, ρ = ρ1 ?R ρ2, with overwhelming probability.
3.1 Strong Verifiability
We say that a voting scheme achieves strong verifiability if it has individual and universal verifiability
under the sole trust assumption that the registrar and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest.
More formally, a voting scheme has strong verifiability if it has verifiability against a dishonest bulletin
board and verifiability against a dishonest registrar. These are defined below.
3.1.1 Election verifiability against a dishonest bulletin board
This is an extension of security property already addressed in [18, 19]. Our novelty is that we assume the
bulletin board to be possibly dishonest, and in particular it may stuff ballots in the name of voters who
did never cast a vote. Of course, a verifiable protocol should forbid or at least detect such a malicious
behavior.
We consider an adversary against individual and universal verifiability that is allowed to corrupt
trustee, users and bulletin board. Only the registration authority is honest. More precisely, for the bulletin
board, we let the adversary replace or delete any ballot. The adversary only looses control on the bulletin
board once the voting phase ends and before the tallying starts. Indeed, at this point it is assumed that
everyone has the same view of the public BB.
Let L denote the set of public credentials, U the set of public/secret credentials pairs, and CU the set of
corrupted users. The adversary can query oracles Oreg,Ocorrupt and Ovote. Let HVote contain triples
(id, v, b) that have been output byOvote (if voter id voted multiple times, only the last ballot is retained);
while the list Checked consists of all pairs (id, v, b) ∈ HVote such that CheckedVoter(id, v, b) = 1, that
is, Checked corresponds to voters that have checked that their ballots will be counted (typically running
VerifyVote).
• Oreg(id): invokes algorithm Credential(λ, id), it returns upkid and keeps uskid secret. It also
updates the lists L = L ∪ {upkid} and U = U ∪ {(id, upkid, uskid)}.
• Ocorrupt(id): firstly, checks if an entry (id, ∗, ∗) appears in U ; if not, stops. Else, outputs
(upkid, uskid) and updates CU = CU ∪ {(id, upkid)}.
• Ovote(id, v): if (id, ∗, ∗) /∈ U or (id, ∗) ∈ CU or v /∈ V, aborts; else returns b = Vote(id, upkid, uskid, v)
and replaces any previous entry (id, ∗, ∗) in HVote with (id, v, b).
Any voting scheme should guarantee that the result output by Tally(BB, sk) counts the actual votes
cast by honest voters. In particular an adversary controlling a subset of eligible voters, the trustee and the
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Experiment ExpverbA,V(λ)
(1) (pk, sk)← Setup(λ)
(2) (BB, ρ,Π)← AOreg,Ocorrupt,Ovote
(3) if Verify(BB, ρ,Π) = 0 return 0
(4) if ρ =⊥ return 0
(5) if ∃ (idA1 , vA1 , ∗), . . . , (idAnA , vAnA , ∗) ∈ HVote\Checked
∃ vB1 , . . . , vBnB ∈ V s.t. 0 ≤ nB ≤ |CU|
s.t. ρ = ρ
({vEi }nEi=1) ?R ρ ({vAi }nAi=1) ?R ρ ({vBi }nBi=1)
return 0 else return 1
where Checked = {(idE1 , vE1 , bE1 ), . . . , (idEnE , vEnE , bEnE )}
Figure 1: Verifiability against a malicious bulletin board
bulletin board, should not be able to alter the output of the tally so that honest votes are not counted in ρ.
More precisely, verifiability against a dishonest board shall guarantee that ρ as output by the algorithm
Tally actually counts:
1. votes cast by honest voters who checked that their ballot appeared in the bulletin board (corresponds
to {vEi }nEi=1 in Figure 1);
2. a subset of the votes cast by honest voters who did not check this. Indeed it can not be ensured that
ρ counted their votes but it might still be the case that some of their ballots were not deleted by the
adversary (corresponds to {vAi }nAi=1 in Figure 1).
3. For corrupted voters, it is only guaranteed that the adversary cannot cast more ballots than users
were corrupted, and that ballots produced by corrupted voters contribute to ρ only with admissible
votes v ∈ V (corresponds to {vBi }nBi=1).
The verifiability against a malicious board game is formally given by experiment ExpverbA in Figure 1.
We say that a voting protocol V is verifiable against a dishonest board if there exists a negligible function
ν(λ) such that, for any PPT adversary A, SuccverbV (A) = Pr
[
ExpverbA,V(λ) = 1
]
< ν(λ).
3.1.2 Election verifiability against a dishonest registration authority
The corresponding experiment ExpvergA,V defining verifiability against a malicious registration authority and
malicious trustee and voters, but honest bulletin board, is very similar to the experiment in Figure 1. The
adversary has access to oraclesOvote(id, v) andOcorrupt(id) as before, and is additionally given access
to an oracle Ocast(id, b), which runs Box(BB, b). This models the fact that the adversary cannot delete
nor add ballots anymore since the bulletin box is now honest. However, the adversary is not given in this
experiment access to the Oreg oracle, since it controls the registrar and thus can register users arbitrarily,
even with malicious credentials. The adversary uses Ocorrupt(id) to define voter id as a corrupted user,
i.e. voter id’s actions are under the control of the adversary.
In ExpvergA,V , the adversary does not output BB, since the bulletin board is honest. Note that a dishonest
registration authority may prevent some voters from voting by providing wrong credentials. Depending
on the protocol, voters may not notice it, therefore some honestly cast ballots may be discarded.
We say that V is verifiable against a dishonest registration authority if there exists a negligible func-
tion ν(λ) such that, SuccvergV (A) = Pr
[
ExpvergA,V(λ) = 1
]
< ν(λ), for any PPT adversary A.
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3.2 Weak Verifiability
We say that a voting scheme has weak verifiability if it has individual and universal verifiability assuming
that the bulletin board and the registration authority are both honest. That is, an adversary in the weak
verifiability game can only corrupt a subset of voters and the trustee.
The experiment ExpverwA,V defining weak verifiability (see Appendix A for a detailed description), is
a variation of the experiment ExpvergA,V . In this case, the adversary can only add ballots to the box via
Ocast (so it cannot stuff the ballot box nor delete ballots). The adversary is only allowed to register
voters through Oreg, and can only access voters’ secret credentials by calling the Ocorrupt oracle. We
say that a voting protocol V is weakly verifiable if there exists a negligible function ν(λ) such that,
SuccverwV (A) = Pr
[
ExpverwA,V(λ) = 1
]
< ν(λ), for any PPT adversary A.
3.3 Tally Uniqueness
In addition to verifiability, Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [19], as well as Delaune, Kremer and Ryan [13],
put forward the notion of tally uniqueness. Tally uniqueness of a voting protocol ensures that the tally of
an election is unique. In other words, two different tallies ρ 6= ρ′ can not be accepted by the verification
algorithm, even if all the players in the system are malicious.
More formally, the goal of the adversary against tally uniqueness is to output a public key pk, that con-
tains a list of public credentials, a bulletin board BB, and two tallies ρ 6= ρ′, and corresponding proofs of
valid tabulation Π and Π′, such that both pass verification, i.e. Verify(BB, ρ,Π) = Verify(BB, ρ′,Π′) =
1. A voting protocol V has tally uniqueness if every PPT adversary A has a negligible advantage in this
game.
Intuitively, verifiability ensures that the tally corresponds to a plausible instantiations of the players
(onto property) while tally uniqueness ensures that, given a tally, there is at most one plausible instantia-
tion (one-to-one property).
4 Sufficient conditions for verifiability
In this section we identify sufficient conditions for (individual and universal) verifiability in single-pass
voting protocols. In the first place, Section 4.1, we define a property for voting protocols, that we call
accuracy, and we show that it implies weak verifiability. As explained in the introduction, weak verifia-
bility is not a completely satisfactory property, but it is the highest verifiability level that can be achieved
in remote voting systems where the only the bulletin board authenticates voters and therefore it can eas-
ily stuff itself. This is notably the case for Helios [3]. Nevertheless, we give in Section 4.3 a generic
construction that transforms a voting protocol that has weak verifiability, into a voting protocol that has
strong verifiability, namely it is verifiable under the weaker trust assumption that the registrar and the
board are not simultaneously dishonest.
4.1 Accuracy
We introduce a property for voting protocols that is called accuracy. We say that a voting protocol V has
accuracy (equivalently it is accurate) if for any ballot b it holds with overwhelming probability that
1. (Validate(b) = 1 ∧ Verify({b}, ρb,Πb) = 1 ) =⇒ ρb = ρ(vb) for some vb ∈ V
2. Verify (BB,Tally(BB, sk)) = 1 for any bulletin board BB
Condition 1 reflects the natural requirement that even a dishonest ballot that passes the validity test
corresponds to an admissible vote. In Helios-like protocols, this is typically ensured by requiring the voter
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to produce a proof that the encrypted vote belongs to V. Condition 2 guarantees that the proof produced
by a faithful run of the tally procedure passes the verification test. In practice, this property usually holds
by design.
4.2 A sufficient condition for weak verifiability
We show that correctness (Section 2.2), accuracy (Section 4.1) and tally uniqueness (Section 3.3) suffice
to ensure weak verifiability against a dishonest tallying authority. Since these properties are simple and
easy to check, this result may often ease the proof of verifiability. We illustrate this fact by using these
criteria to give in Section 5 a simple proof that Helios-BPW is weakly verifiable.
Theorem 4.1 Let V be a correct, accurate and tally unique voting protocol that admits partial tallying.
Then V satisfies weak verifiability.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
4.2.1 Signature schemes with verification uniqueness
We aim at designing a generic construction that provides strong verifiability. Our construction relies on an
existentially-unforgeable (EUF-CMA) signature scheme as a building block, whose syntax and properties
are given next.
Definition 4.2 (Signature scheme) A signature scheme consists of three algorithms S = (SKey,Sign,
SVerify), such that
• SKey(1λ) outputs a pair of verification/signing keys (upk, usk).
• Sign(usk,m) on inputs a signing key usk and a messagem outputs a signature σ.
• SVerify(upk,m, σ) on inputs a verification key upk, a message m and a string σ, outputs 0/1,
meaning invalid/valid signature.
A signature scheme must satisfy correctness, namely SVerify(upk,m, Sign(usk,m)) = 1 with overwhelm-
ing probability, where (upk, usk)← SKey(1λ).
We further need to control the behaviour of the signature scheme when keys are (dishonestly) chosen
outside the expected range. More precisely, we need to ensure that the output of SVerify(upk,m, σ) is
deterministic, even for inputs outside the corresponding domains. We call this verification uniqueness.
4.3 A sufficient condition for strong verifiability
We provide a generic construction that protects any voting scheme that has weak verifiability, that is
assuming that the bulletin board and registrar are both honest, into a voting scheme that has string verifi-
ability, that is under the weaker assumption that board and registrar are not simultaneously dishonest.
Let V = (Setup′,Credential′,Vote′,VerifyVote′,Validate′,Box′,Tally′,Verify′) be a voting proto-
col, possibly without credentials, like Helios. Our generic construction transforms V into Vcred as follows.
We first require the registration authority to create a public/secret credential pair (upk, usk) for each voter.
Each key pair corresponds to a credential needed to cast a vote. The association between credentials and
voters does not need to be publicly known and only the unordered list of verification keys (the public
credentials) is published. In the resulting voting scheme Vcred, every player acts as in V except that now,
each voter further signs his/her ballot with his/her signing key usk. Moreover, the bulletin board, upon
receiving a ballot, performs the usual checks and further verifies the signature (that should correspond
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to one of the official verification keys). The board also needs to maintain an internal state st that links
successful voters’ authentications with successful signature verifications, i.e. it keeps links (id, upkid).
This is needed to prevent a dishonest voter id′, who has gained knowledge of several secret credentials
usk1, . . . , uskt, from stuffing/overriding the board with ballots containing the corresponding public cre-
dentials upk1, . . . , upkt. We call this a multiple impersonation attack. Our generic transformation is
summarized in Figure 2.
Voter
Election Administrator
Registrar
login/pwd
Sign(usk,ballot)
ballot
upk
list of voters
upk,usk
list of voters
Bulletin Box
V
Vcred
Figure 2: Generic construction for strong verifiability.
Formally, let S = (SKey,Sign,SVerify) be a signature scheme. Let us consider Vcred = (Setup,Credential,Vote,Validate,Box,VerifyVote,Tally,Verify)
the voting protocol with credentials obtained from V and S as follows:
Setup(1λ) runs (pk′, sk′) ← Setup′(1λ) and sets pk ← (pk′, L), sk ← sk′, where L is a list initial-
ized to empty that is defined below. Let us recall that pk′ potentially contains a list L′ of public
credentials inherited from V ′. Returns (pk, sk). We say that L is ill-formed if |L| > τ , (i.e. there
are more public credentials than eligible voters) or if L has repeated elements.
Credential(1λ, id) is run by the registrar and computes (upk, usk) ← SKey(1λ); the bulletin board
computes (upk′, usk′) ← Credential′(1λ, id). The list L is updated as L ← L ∪ {upk}. Next,
upk← (upk, upk′) and usk← (usk, usk′) are returned.
Vote(id,upk,usk, v) runs α ← Vote′(id, upk′, usk′, v), σ ← Sign(usk, α) and returns a ballot b ←
(upk, α, σ), which is sent to the bulletin board through an authenticated channel2.
Validate(b) parses b = (upk, α, σ). If SVerify(upk, α, σ) 6= 1 outputs 0. Else, outputs Validate′(α).
Box(BB, b) parses b = (upk, α, σ) after a successful authentication, by voter idwith credentials (upk′, usk′),
to the bulletin board. BB is let unchanged if upk /∈ L, or if Validate(b) rejects. Next (1) if an en-
try of the form (id, ∗) or (∗, upk) exists in its local state st, then: (1.a) if (id, upk) ∈ st and
α ∈ Box′(BB′, α) (BB′ is updated with α), then removes any ballot in BB containing upk, updates
BB ← BB ∪ {b}, and returns BB; (1.b) else, returns BB. Otherwise, (2) adds (id, upk) to st, and
(2.a) if α ∈ Box′(BB′, α), adds b to BB, and returns BB; else (2.b) returns BB. The checks in Steps
(1) and (2) are performed to prevent multiple impersonation attacks.
2This channel is built around the credential information (id, upk′, usk′).
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VerifyVote(BB, id,upk,usk, b) verifies that the ballot b appears inBB. Intuitively, this check should be
done by voters when the voting phase is over. If b = (upk, α, σ) ∈ BB, then outputsVerifyVote′(BB′,
id, upk′, usk′, α). Otherwise, outputs 0.
Tally(BB, sk) returns ρ :=⊥ and Π := ∅ if L is not well-formed. Else, checks next whether BB is
well-formed. We say BB is well-formed if: every upk in BB appears only once; every upk in BB
appears in L; Validate(b) = 1 for every b ∈ BB. If any of these checks fails (meaning that the
bulletin board cheated) the trustee outputs ρ :=⊥ andΠ := ∅. Else the trustee runs Tally′(BB′, sk),
where BB′ = {α1, . . . , ατ} if BB = {(upk1, α1, σ1), . . . , (upkτ , ατ , στ )}.
Verify(BB, ρ,Π) starts by checking whether L and BB are well-formed. If not, outputs 1 if ρ =⊥; else it
outputs 0. Else, runs Verify′(BB′, ρ,Π), where BB′ = {α1, . . . , ατ} if BB = {(upk1, α1, σ1), . . . ,
(upkτ , ατ , στ )}.
4.3.1 From weak to strong verifiability
Our generic construction converts a weakly verifiable voting scheme into a strongly verifiable voting
scheme.
Theorem 4.3 Let V be a voting protocol that satisfies weak verifiability, admits partial tallying and
satisfies tally uniqueness. Let S be an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. Then Vcred satisfies
strong verifiability.
Proof:
It is a consequence of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 4.4 Let V satisfy weak verifiability and tally uniqueness. Let S be an existentially unforgeable
signature scheme. Then Vcred has verifiability against a dishonest bulletin board.
This lemma is proven by showing that any adversary against the verifiability of Vcred, controlling the
bulletin board, is “as powerful” as any adversary against the weak verifiability of V , unless it can break
the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme S. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.5 Let V be weakly verifiable and tally unique. Then Vcred has verifiability against a dishonest
registrar.
Note that Lemma 4.5 relies on the weak verifiability of the voting scheme. Indeed, if the registrar is
dishonest, it has all the credentials. Therefore only the bulletin board may prevent him from stuffing the
box. Typically, weakly verifiable schemes assume an authenticated channel between the voters and the
box, e.g. using some password-based authentication mechanism. This simple proof is given in Appendix
D. /
Theorem 4.6 If V satisfies tally uniqueness and S satisfies verification uniqueness, then Vcred preserves
tally uniqueness.
Our transformation also preserves ballot privacy. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that our transforma-
tion of the original protocol does not significantly change the behaviour of the underlying voting scheme.
In particular, every valid ballot produced by our transformed voting scheme corresponds to a valid ballot
in the original voting scheme, and viceversa. In the full version of this work we give a proof of ballot
privacy using the game-based game definition from [6]. The reduction is straightforward and there are no
technical difficulties involved.
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Theorem 4.7 If V satisfies privacy then Vcred satisfies privacy.
5 Helios-C : Helios with Credentials
In this section we modify the design of Helios 4.0 voting system [3]. Actually, the current version does
not ensure ballot privacy due to the fact that dishonest voters may duplicate ballots [10]. We therefore
consider a slight modification of Helios 4.0 that includes weeding of duplicate ballots and that has been
proved secure w.r.t. ballot privacy [6]. We aim at achieving (individual and universal) verifiability under
a weaker trust assumption. Our modification consists in adding (verifiable) credentials to prevent ballot
stuffing. We name it Helios-C, as a shortening for Helios with Credentials. For readability, we describe
Helios for a single choice election (voters may simply vote 0 or 1). It can be easily generalized to elections
with several candidates. We assume an authenticated channel between each voter and the bulletin board.
This is typically realized in Helios through password-based authentication.
We use the ElGamal [14] IND-CPA cryptosystemD = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) in a given groupGwhere
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds; the Schnorr signature scheme S = (SKeyGen,Sign,SVerify)
[24] over the groupG; the NIZK proof system [8, 11]DisjProofH(g, pk, R, S) to prove in zero-knowledge
that (R,S) encrypts g0 or g1 (with proof builder DisjProve and proof verifier DisjVerify); and the NIZK
proof system [8] EqDlG(g,R, vk, c) to prove in zero-knowledge that logg vk = logR c for g,R, vk, c ∈ G
(with proof builder PrEq and proof verifier VerifyEq). H and G are hash functions mapping to Zq.
Formally, Helios-C consists of eight algorithms Vheliosc = (Setup,Credential,Vote,Validate,VerifyVote,Box,
Tally,Verify) defined below:
Setup(1λ) chooses G a cyclic group of order q and g ∈ G a generator. It randomly chooses sk R←
Zq and sets pk = gsk. Hash functions G,H : {0, 1}? → Zq are chosen. It outputs pk ←
(G, q, pk, L,G,H,V = {0, 1}), the public key of the election and sk = (pk, sk), with L initialized
as the empty set.
Credential(1λ, id, L) generates a signing key pair for each voter. It runs (upk, usk)← SKeyGen(1λ). It
adds upk to L and outputs (upk, usk).
Vote (id, upk, usk, v) it is used by a voter of identity id with credentials (upk, usk) to create a ballot b
corresponding to vote v as follows:
(1) Encrypts v ∈ {0, 1} as C = Enc(pk, gv) = (R,S). Computes a proof pi = DisjProveH(g, pk,
R, S, r) showing that the encrypted vote is 0 or 1.
(2) Computes σ ← Sign(usk, (C, pi)), namely a signature on the ciphertext and its proof. The
ballot is defined as b = (upk, (C, pi), σ).
(3) The voter submits the ballot b by authenticating itself to the bulletin board.
Validate(b) checks that the ballot is valid, that is, that all proofs are correct. Formally, it parses the ballot
b as (upk, (C, pi), σ). It then checks whether: (1) upk ∈ L; (2) DisjVerifyH(g, pk, C, pi) = 1;
(4) SVerify(upk, σ, (C, pi)) accepts. If any step fails, it returns 0; else it returns 1.
VerifyVote(id, upk, usk, b) returns the value of the test b ∈ BB.
Box(BB, b) parses b = (upk, (C, pi), σ) after a successful authentication from a voter id. BB is let
unchanged if upk /∈ L, or Validate(b) rejects or C appears previously in BB. Next, (1) if an entry
of the form (id, ∗) or (∗, upk) exists in its local state st, then: (1.a) if (id, upk) ∈ st, removes any
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previous ballot in BB containing upk, updates BB← BB ∪ {b} and returns BB; (1.b) else, returns
BB. Otherwise, (2) adds (id, upk) to st, updates BB← BB ∪ {b} and returns BB.
Tally(BB, sk) consists of the following steps:
(1) Runs Validate(b) for every b ∈ BB. Outputs ρ =⊥ and Π = ∅ if any such b is rejected.
(2) Parses each ballot b ∈ BB as (upkb, (Cb, pib), σb).
(3) Checks whether upkb appears in a previous entry in BB or whether upkb /∈ L. If so, outputs
ρ =⊥ and Π = ∅. Else,
(4) Computes the result ciphertext CΣ = (RΣ, SΣ) = (
∏
b∈BBRb,
∏
b∈BB Sb ), where Cb =
(Rb, Sb). This of course relies on the homomorphic property of the El Gamal encryption
scheme.
(5) Computes gρ ← SΣ · (RΣ)−sk. Then ρ to be published is obtained from gρ in time
√
τ for ρ
lying in the interval [0, τ ] and τ equals the number of legitimate voters.
(6) Finally Π := PrEqG
(
g, pk, RΣ, SΣ · (gρ)−1, sk
)
.
Verify(BB, ρ,Π)
(1) Performs the checks (1-3) done in Tally. If any of the checks fails, then returns 0 unless the
result is itself ⊥, in which case outputs 1. Else,
(2) Computes the result ciphertext (RΣ, SΣ) =
(∏
b∈BBRb,
∏
b∈BB Sb
)
.
(3) Returns the output of VerifyEqG
(
g, pk, RΣ, SΣ · (gρ)−1,Π
)
.
Theorem 5.1 Helios-C has tally uniqueness, strong verifiability and ballot privacy under the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption in the Random Oracle Model.
Since Helios-C = Helios-BPWcred and the Schnorr signature scheme is EUF-CMA in the Random
Oracle Model under the Discrete Logarithm assumption inG, Theorem 4.3 (Section 4.3) allows to deduce
the strong verifiability of Helios-C from the weak verifiability of Helios-BPW. Finally, since Helios-BPW
has ballot privacy under the DDH assumption in the Random Oracle Model (Theorem 3 in [6]), then
Helios-C has ballot privacy under the same assumptions.
Theorem 5.2 Helios-BPW is weakly verifiable under the Discrete Logarithm assumption in the Random
Oracle Model.
Proof: We need to show that Helios-BPW is correct, accurate and has tally uniqueness thanks to Theorem
4.1. We omit the proof of correctness for Helios-BPW since it easily follows from the correctness of the
involved primitives, i.e. the ElGamal cryptosystem, Schnorr signature and NIZKs.
Let us show that Helios-BPW has tally uniqueness, where Helios-BPW = (Setup′,Vote′,Validate′,
VerifyVote′,Box′,Tally,′ Verify′). The output of Verify′ is determined by the outputs of the verification
tests of the NIZK systems DisjProofH and EqDlG, which constitute proof of memberships to the cor-
responding languages with negligible error probability, and hence the output of Verify′ is unique on his
inputs.
With respect to the accuracy of Helios-BPW, we need to show that for any ballot b it holds that if
Validate′(b) = 1 and Verify′({b}, ρb,Πb) = 1, then ρb = ρ(vb) for some vb ∈ V. Let α = (C, pi) be such
that DisjVerify(g, pk, C, pi) = 1. Since DisjProofH is a NIZK obtained by applying Fiat-Shamir to a Σ-
protocol [17], thenDisjProofH is a proof that (g, pk, Rb, Sb) ∈ LEqDl or (g, pk, Rb, Sb·g−1) ∈ LEqDl with
soundness error 1/q. In other words, if Validate′(b) = 1 and Verify′({b}, ρb,Πb) = 1, then vb ∈ {0, 1}
with overwhelming probability. This proves accuracy of Helios-BPW. /
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candidates 2 5 10 20 30 50
enc+proofs 600 1197 2138 4059 6061 9617
sign 196 215 248 301 358 484
sig verif < 10 < 10 < 10 < 10 < 10 < 10
ballot verif 110 210 390 720 1070 1730
Figure 3: Overhead in miliseconds induced by adding credentials to Helios
6 Implementation
We have implemented a proof of concept of Helios-C, openly accessible at [15], and tested it in a mock
election in our lab.
In Helios-C credentials are generated by a third-party provider and sent to the voters by snail mail.
Clearly, it would be cumbersome for voters to copy their signature key by typing it. We used a trick that
consists in sending only the random seed used for generating the key, which can be encoded in about
12-15 alphanumeric characters depending on the desired entropy. It is expected that this seed is used by
the provider to add the generated public key to L, then sent (as a password) to its rightful recipient and
immediately destroyed.
Our variant of Helios requires voters to additionally sign their ballots. Table 3 shows the overhead
induced by the signature, for various numbers of candidates (from 2 to 50). The two first lines are timings
on the client side: the first one indicates the time needed by the voter’s browser to form the ballot (without
signature) while the second line indicates the computation time for signing. The third and fourth lines
indicate the computation time on the server side for performing the verification tests (well-formedness of
the ballot, validity of the proofs of knowledge and validity of the signature). Since the ballot includes the
public key of the voter, the server simply needs to verify one signature for each ballot and to verify that
the public keys indeed belongs to the set of authorized keys, which can be done in logarithmic time. We
use a 256-bit multiplicative subgroup of a 2048-bit prime field for ElGamal and Schnorr operations. The
figures have been obtained on a computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 CPU @ 3.40GHz, running
Firefox 18. Unsurprisingly, the overhead of the signature is small compared to the computation time of
the whole ballot.
We have tested our implementation in a mock election in June 2013, among approximately 30 voters.
The result of the election and in particular all its public data (including ballots) can be found at [15].
In practice, it is also needed to provide a password/credential recovery procedure in case voters lose
their credentials. In case revoting is authorized, we further assume that the registrar keeps the link between
users and public credentials during the election so that the old (lost) credential can be erased from the
authorized list.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a generic construction that enforces strong verifiability. Applied to Helios, the re-
sulting system Helios-C prevents ballot stuffing, still retaining the simplicity of Helios, as demonstrated
by our test election, under the trust assumption that registrar and bulletin board are not simultaneously
dishonest. For simplicity, we have presented our framework for a single vote (yes/no vote) and for a sin-
gle trustee. All our results can be easily extended to multiple candidates elections and multiple trustees,
possibly with threshold decryption as described in [9].
We would like to point out a more appealing variant of our transformation from a theoretical point of
view. In this variant, voters generate their individual credentials (i.e. a signing key pair) by themselves.
Thus a malicious registrar cannot sign on behalf of honest users, as it would only be responsible of reg-
istering credentials for eligible voters. We think, however, that letting the registrar generate credentials
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on behalf of voters, as we do in Helios-C, is a more practical choice: most voters will not have the re-
quired knowledge to perform the critical procedure of generating credentials with a minimum of security
guarantees.
Even if most ballot counting functions admit partial tallying, especially for practical counting func-
tions, some functions do not admit partial tallying, like the majority function. As future work, we plan
to investigate whether we can devise a definition of verifiability for schemes that do not admit partial
tallying.
Strong verifiability of Helios-C assumes that either the registration authority or the ballot box is
honest. We could further thresholdize the registration authority, by distributing each credential among
several registrars. We plan to explore the possibility to go further and design a (practical) voting scheme
that offers verifiability without any trust assumption (like vote by hand-rising), and ballot privacy under
some trust assumptions, like the fact that some of the authorities are honest.
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A Experiments Defining Verifiability
The experiment defining verifiability against a malicious registration authority, is described in Figure 4,
while the experiment defining weak verifiability is described in Figure 5. The lists HVote and Checked
are like in Figure 1 (see Section 3.1).
Experiment ExpvergA,V(λ)
(1) (pk, sk)← Setup(λ)
(2) (ρ,Π)← AOcorrupt,Ovote,Ocast
(3) if Verify(BB, ρ,Π) = 0 return 0
(4) if ρ =⊥ return 0
(5) if ∃ (idA1 , vA1 , ∗), . . . , (idAnA , vAnA , ∗) ∈ HVote\Checked
∃ vB1 , . . . , vBnB ∈ V s.t. 0 ≤ nB ≤ |CU|
s.t. ρ = ρ
({vEi }nEi=1) ?R ρ ({vAi }nAi=1) ?R ρ ({vBi }nBi=1)
return 0 else return 1
where Checked = {(idE1 , vE1 , bE1 ), . . . , (idEnE , vEnE , bEnE )}
Figure 4: Verifiability against a dishonest registration authority
Experiment ExpverwA,V(λ)
(1) (pk, sk)← Setup(λ)
(2) (ρ,Π)← AOreg,Ocorrupt,Ovote,Ocast
(3) if Verify(BB, ρ,Π) = 0 return 0
(4) if ρ =⊥ return 0
(5) if ∃ vB1 , . . . , vBnB ∈ V s.t. 0 ≤ nB ≤ |CU|
s.t. ρ = ρ
({vAi }nAi=1) ?R ρ ({vBi }nBi=1)
return 0 else return 1
where HVote = {(idA1 , vA1 , ∗), . . . , (idAnA , vAnA , ∗)}
Figure 5: Weak verifiability
B Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let (BB, ρ,Π) be such that Verify(BB, ρ,Π) = 1 and ρ is not ⊥. Let BB = BBA ∪ BBB , where BBA is
the list of ballots appearing in BB that have been output by the oracle Ovote; hence they have been cast
by honest voters. Since the bulletin board is honest, we know that every b ∈ BB passes Validate.
We want show that the equation ρ = ρ
({vAi }nAi=1) ?R ρ ({vBi }nBi=1), where vB1 , . . . , vBnB ∈ V and
0 ≤ nB ≤ |CU|, must hold with overwhelming probability.
(i) Let BBA = {bA1 , . . . , bAna}. Since the bulletin board is honest, no ballot coming from an honest
voter has been deleted. Then na = nA. Since V admits partial tallying and is correct, we can
conclude that (ρA,ΠA) ← Tally({bAi }nAi=1, sk) is such that ρA = ρ(vA1 ) ?R . . . ρ(vAnA), where{vAi }nAi=1 are the votes that the adversary cast on behalf of the honest voters, i.e. {bAi }nAi=1 =
{Vote(idAi , upkAi , uskAi , vAi )}nAi=1.
Inria
Election Verifiability for Helios under Weaker Trust Assumptions 19
(ii) Let BBB = {bB1 , . . . , bBnB} be the ballots appearing in BB that have been directly cast by the adver-
sary. That nB ≤ |CU| follows from the fact that the bulletin board is honest and thus each voter can
cast only one ballot to BB. By Condition 2 of accuracy we know that Verify(BBB , ρB ,ΠB) = 1,
where (ρB ,ΠB)← Tally(BBB , sk). Additionally, any (ρ′B ,Π′B) that passes Verify(BBB , ρ′B ,Π′B)
satisfies (ρB ,ΠB) = (ρ′B ,Π
′
B) by tally uniqueness. Finally, partial tallying of V and Condition 1
of accuracy imply that ρB = ρ(vB1 ) ?R . . . ?R ρ(v
B
nB ) for v
B
i ∈ V.
(iii) Partial tallying ensures thatTally(BBA∪BBB , sk) = (ρA?RρB ,Π′), where (ρX ,ΠX)← Tally(BBX , sk)
for X = A,B.
Finally tally uniqueness together with (i), (ii), (iii) imply that ρ = ρA ?R ρB .
C Proof of Lemma 4.4
Firstly, we notice that since ρ 6=⊥, it follows from the specification of Verify that BB is well-formed,
and thus BB′ is well-formed. This is true because every ballot b ∈ BB passes Validate and thus
every atomic ballot α ∈ BB′ passes Validate′. Secondly, since BB is well-formed, we know that
Verify(BB, ρ+,Π+) := Verify′(BB′, ρ+,Π+) for any pair (ρ+,Π+).
(i) We want to show that every ballot {αEi }nEi=1 corresponding to a vote query in Checked appears in the
final board BB′. Indeed, every vote in Checked has its corresponding ballot bEi = (upk, α
E
i , σ)
appearing in BB, and thus a corresponding atomic ballot αEi ∈ BB′. The fact that every vote in
Checked is numbered in ρ is guaranteed by the weak verifiability of V ′.
(ii) Let us now see that every ballot bAi not corresponding to a vote query in Checked (thus bAi /∈
{bEi }nEi=1), nor belonging to a corrupted user (thus bAi /∈ {bBi }nBi=1), must correspond to a vote
query in HVote. Or in other words, that ballot stuffing by the bulletin board is infeasible.
Assume on the contrary that the adversary has added a ballot b = (upkid, α, σ) to BB, such that
Validate(b) = 1, but b was never output by Ovote(id, ∗). That implies tha the signature σ on α is
valid, while α was never signed by the challenger. Thus, A would succeed in this case in forging a
signature for public signing key upk, which is infeasible since S is existentially unforgeable.
(iii) If nB > |CU|, where nB is the number of ballots cast by the adversary, then:
(iii-1) there are at least two ballots bi = (upk, αi, σi) and bj = (upk, αj , σj), corresponding to the
same credential upk. But this is discarded, since BB is well-formed.
(iii-2) the adversary added a valid ballot b = (upkid, ∗, ∗) with upk ∈ L, without invoking
Ocorrupt(id). In this case, a ballot b = (upk, α, σ) was output by the adversary, such that
σ is a valid signature on α, without knowledge of usk, which would violate the existential
unforgeability of S.
Facts (i-iii) imply that for every adversary B in experiment ExpverbB,Vcred there exists a slightly less
powerful adversary A in experiment ExpverwA,V . This ends the proof.
D Proof of Lemma 4.5
Proof: Let BB = {bAi }nai=1 ∪ {bBi }nBi=1 and BB′ = {αAi }nai=1 ∪ {αBi }nBi=1, where bAi for i = 1, . . . , na
are ballots that have been output by oracle Ovote (and the αi’s are obtained from the bi’s as specified
in the transformation). Since BB is well-formed (the bulletin board is honest) we know that Verify(BB,
ρ+,Π+) := Verify′(BB′, ρ+,Π+) for any pair (ρ+,Π+).
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(i) The adversary cannot add nor delete ballots b = (upkid, α, σ) to BB on behalf of an honest voter id
with (id, ∗) ∈ HVote, since it will not be able to successfully authenticate himself as voter id with
the honest bulletin board.
(ii) nB ≤ |CU|, the number of corrupted voters, since the bulletin board is honest and then the adversary
cannot impersonate non-corrupted voters to the bulletin board.
Facts (i), (ii) imply that an adversary against the verifiability of Vcred, controlling the registrar, has no
more power than an adversary playing the weak verifiability game of V . This ends the proof. /
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